West Africa in the Age of Revolutions

 

The coup in Libreville Gabon is less a marker of democratic erosion than a signal of the revolt against France’s neocolonial domination.

The West African revolutions were a series of uprisings that took place in the late 18th and early 19th centuries in the region that is now modern-day Nigeria. These revolutions were significant because they challenged the existing political and social order, which was characterized by the dominance of wealthy elites involved in the slave trade and high taxation 12. The most notable of these revolutions was led by 'Uthman dan Fodio, who established a new Islamic state in northern Nigeria between 1804 and 1811.

The West African revolutions were also important because they were part of a broader wave of revolutionary activity that swept across the Atlantic world during this period. They were linked to other revolutions taking place at the time, such as the American Revolution, the French Revolution, and the Haitian Revolution 1. However, despite their significance, these revolutions have often been overlooked by historians 2.

In conclusion, the West African revolutions were important because they challenged the existing political and social order in Nigeria and were part of a broader wave of revolutionary activity taking place across the Atlantic world during that period.

We want France out of our country because France does not bring any positive thing except trouble, poverty, terrorism and so on,” Aboubacar Salou Maiga says rather emphatically. Maiga, 44, is a Nigerien citizen who alongside hundreds of others, welcomed the recent military coup that ousted Niger’s democratically-elected leader, Mohamed Bazoum. He believes Russia can be a fairer partner for Africa’s development. “Russia is a serious country. Their partnership is a win-win whereas France is a thief,” he adds.

The political crisis in Niger, a uranium-rich state in central Sahel, has continued to escalate since the 26 July putsch, adding to the increasing number of former French colonies that have cut ties with France. French forces have been kicked out of Mali and Burkina Faso following similar military takeovers in those countries amidst a wave of anti-French sentiment sweeping across the region.

Niger’s coup leaders also revoked military cooperation agreements with France, and recently ordered the French ambassador, Sylvain Itte, to leave the country within 48 hours – an ultimatum Paris has defied, creating a tense standoff.

But with the latest coup  in oil-rich Gabon where the military has placed President Ali Bongo under house arrest hours after he won a third term in an election held over the weekend, France’s presence in the region faces more uncertainty. Ali Bongo took over  in 2009 following the death of his father, Omar Bongo Ondima, who had ruled Gabon since 1967.

Equatorial empire

In 1910 Gabon became one of the four colonies within the federation of French Equatorial Africa alongside the Central African Republic, the Republic of Chad, and the Republic of Congo.

“Anti-French sentiments are rooted in a colonial history marked by violence and extraction that has left deep wounds,” Professor Adeline Masquelier told African Arguments. Masquelier is a professor at the Department of Anthropology, Tulane University and author of three books on Niger.

“Rumours that Mohamed Bazoum, the democratically elected president of Niger, was a puppet of the French government served to legitimize the recent coup in Niger. Though the coup was triggered by fears that President Bazoum had plans to reform the presidential guard and demote the top brass, including General Tchiani, Niger’s self-appointed military leader, coup leaders have taken advantage of the growing anti-French antipathy among the population to assert their authority,” she added.

French presence in Africa dates back to the 17th century, but it was not until the 19th century during the scramble for Africa that it expanded its reach considerably with the conquests of West and Equatorial Africa and the establishment of protectorates in Tunisia and Morocco. For almost a century and a half since then, France maintained a colonial empire in Africa stretching from the Maghreb through the Western and Central sub-Saharan regions.

Unlike the British who relied on the cooperation of local chiefs, French colonies were run under a direct rule system – a style of administration responsible for the different outcomes colonization had in Francophone countries in comparison to their Anglophone neighbours.

“Both British colonial rule and French colonial rule resulted in the exploitation of valuable African resources. The extent to which France has continued to meddle in the politics and economics of its former colonies is what distinguishes it from its European counterparts,” Masquelier added.

French officials controlled every aspect of the administration and affairs of their colonies, and declared everything and everyone in these colonies to be French: “But more as in French property. In other words, as subjects of France rather than citizens. The idea behind the insistence of the rightness and dominance of French language and French culture was for Africans to aspire to be French, but of course they could never really be French because they were black and not actually from France,” Prof. Catherine E. Bolten of the University of Notre Dame, told African Arguments.

Post-Colonial Bullies

Though French colonial rule ended in 1960 when a host of African countries gained independence, France has continued to maintain a hegemonic influence over its former possessions in Africa, both to serve its interests and maintain a last bastion of prestige. This was achieved through a host of political, security, economic and cultural links which helped to project France as a global power while placing the former colonies in the position of vassals. To that end, France signed cooperation accords with its former colonies. Among other strategic links, the accords allowed France to maintain troops in the former colonies and to establish a framework that would allow France to intervene militarily in the region.

Under President de Gaulle, French aid and assistance were made contingent on the signing of these accords, in effect robbing the former French colonies of their full sovereignty. Also, France has until now retained its economic grip on its former colonies through its imposition of a monetary zone that shares the same currency, the CFA franc, created in 1945 as a means of ensuring France’s control of the resources, economic structures, and political systems of sub-Saharan African colonies.

“Backed by the French treasury, the CFA franc is tied to the Euro, and previously the French franc, which means that its value on the global market follows that of the Euro. All the stipulations concerning the CFA franc ultimately benefit France, not African nations, ensuring that France retains control over the West African economic zone and the Central African economic zone. For instance, France can veto any decisions taken by one of the two central banks within the CFA franc zone,” Masquelier added.

While the CFA was reconfigured after these territories earned their independence from France, it effectively remains a colonial currency. “The fact that policies within the CFA franc zone are dictated by the European Central Bank provides a measure of Francophone African nations’ lack of economic sovereignty. Add to that the fact that France has often removed from office Heads of State who attempted to pull out of the CFA franc zone, and you get a good picture of the meddling France has engaged in over the years to preserve its control over large parts of West and Central Africa,” Masquelier added.

Upon independence in 1958 Guinea under its first president, Ahmed Sekou Toure, refused to sign the cooperation accord.

“Stories from Conakry were that the French responded by bringing massive container ships to Conakry and taking everything French with them that was not nailed down, down to the furniture and files in government offices,” Bolten adds. Paris was communicating an important lesson: “If you refuse our continued dominance over you and our casual involvement in your everyday affairs – always and only on our terms – we will strip you of all moveable infrastructure that was built under our rule.” Bolten continues.

“The situation in Guinea revealed the true nature of the relationship between France and its colonies: that this relationship was never meant to be beneficial to those former colonies, nor would it ever be equal, nor would France allow its colonies to succeed on their own terms without France getting credit for it. In essence, France became a post-colonial bully,” she remarks.

Notes on a colonial currency

As more African heads of state declare the CFA franc a colonial relic that must be discarded so they can earn full independence, the French government maintains that the CFA franc is an African currency that exists for the benefit of African economies. Increasingly, however, the chorus of voices demanding that the currency be abandoned is amplifying, with activists now encouraging Africans to boycott French products. Critics have shown that membership to the CFA zone has stifled development and promoted poverty while others assert that abandoning the CFA franc would be a risky, and probably costly, operation.

“But let’s be frank: French corporations are the ones that benefit from the arrangement. The CFA franc is not a sovereign currency. Far from encouraging investment in local economies and enabling entrepreneurs to obtain credit and export their products competitively, the CFA franc has curbed economic growth and held back job creation. In sum, the continued imposition of the CFA franc is a form of economic imperialism. France would not have retained its prominence as a world power had it not been for the lucrative deals it forced its former colonies to sign at independence,” Masquelier explains.

The result is further plundering of the ex-colonies. “Since Niger’s independence in 1960, France has continued to benefit handsomely from Niger’s natural resources,” says Masquelier. Until recently, the French company Areva extracted the uranium that powered many French nuclear plants while Niger remains one of the poorest countries on the planet, with less than 20 percent of its citizens having access to electricity. “People are resentful that despite having rich resources, Niger has not managed to develop” she says.

In addition to economic interference, France has always seen itself as a guarantor of stability in the region, adopting an interventionist policy in Africa that resulted in a legacy of coup d’etats and military interventions since 1960. The latest of these interventions is Operation Barkhane – a 3000-strong anti-insurgent operation led by the French military against Islamist groups in Africa’s Sahel region. The operation which formerly came to an end in November 2022, was organized with the cooperation of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. But critics blame France for the worsening of the insurgency despite the military operation.

“Despite mobilizing important resources, France has failed to contain the growing insurgent threat, and Nigerien people are frustrated and angry. Rumours, encouraged by propaganda campaigns from the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group, of an alliance between France and the extremist factions perpetrating attacks on civilians and soldiers at the Malian and Burkinabe border, have only fueled further antipathy against the former colonial power,” Masquelier adds.

This and more have added fuel to the wave of anti-French sentiment spreading like wildfire across the region with many accusing Macron’s government of meddling in their country’s affairs. Some also blame France for supporting dictatorial regimes in exchange for access to resources and military bases – in short, the perpetuation of the neocolonial system known as FrançAfrique.

Scandals such as the Bokassa diamond saga which cost France’s then president, Valery Giscard d’Estaing his re-election in 1981 on account of diamonds he allegedly received from Central African Republic’s self-appointed emperor, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, or Elf Aquitaine sleaze scandal under the Jacques Chirac and François Mitterrand presidencies that revealed the dirty ties between top French officials and Francophone elites, were a hallmark of FrançAfrique.

“Because they promoted French interests, heads of state like Paul Biya in Cameroon and Ali Bongo in Gabon, enjoyed French support regardless of the corruption and abuse they perpetrated at home. As long as they did not try to renegotiate the terms of their countries’ partnerships with France, French officials turned a blind eye to their excesses. Moreover, France has often intervened militarily to keep pro-French African leaders in power, no matter how unpopular they were at home,” Masquelier explains.

A sticky situation

“If the recent string of coups in Francophone Africa are anything to go by, it is that they signal the rejection of France’s paternalistic policies,” Masquelier told African Arguments. French officials are perceived in Africa as proud and conceited, and still acting as if they are in charge.

“It is perhaps for this reason that, a month after the coup, France is persona non grata in Niger while Nigerien officials still talk to American officials, who have been cautious not to condemn the coup” she observes.

Despite his recent efforts to shed the mantle of paternalism and reframe the terms of France’s partnership with African countries, Macron has not managed to convince ordinary Africans that France can be a trustworthy partner. Vowing not to give in to Niger junta’s pressure for France to recall its ambassador, Macron’s insistence that “one shouldn’t give in to the narrative used by the coup leaders that consists of saying France has become our enemy” is unlikely to win over an African public tired of French domination. And as Masquelier notes, “Having refused to recall its ambassador to Niger, France is now in a sticky situation.”

There are now seven countries in the region under military rule some of whom are already seeking new development and military partners, not least with Russia and its infamous Wagner group.

“The latest coup in Gabon further signals a growing confidence among military elites across the continent that they can and should intervene to forge the futures of their nations. This suggests that France must rethink its Africa policies so that they do more than protect French interests if France wants to remain involved,” noted Masquelier.

Modi’s call for AU membership in the G20 and the China factor

Narendra Modi at a Gandhi memorial, Raj Ghat, in Delhi in Oct 2022. Lately, the Prime Minister has appropriated the anti-imperialist rhetoric of some of his predecessors. Photo courtesy: Narendra Modi

 India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi’s recent call for the African Union’s full membership in the G20 in June 2023 revives the longstanding debate over the G20’s enlargement. The call for the AU’s membership echoes previous calls by other members. Before hosting the G20 Summit last year, Indonesia – not unlike the way Modi has gone about it – raised the issue for discussion. More recently, US President Joe Biden championed the cause of full membership for the AU.  Ostensibly, Washington wants to enhance representation; keener observers suspect other motives, not least countering growing Chinese influence in Africa.

South Africa is the only African country with a permanent seat in the G20, while the European Union (EU) is the sole non-state entity represented. Despite almost half the G20 members belonging to the Global North, the Global South and swing states enjoy relatively stronger positions within the G20 than other platforms. Remarkably, Africa still does not have a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, and faces underrepresentation or limited influence in institutions such as the IMF and, more than a little surprisingly, its own African Development Bank; only five of the top ten shareholders are African states, with the US, Japan, Germany, Canada and France the other significant minority shareholders.

While the African Union joining the G20 would improve global governance and continental representation, India’s interest in this issue goes beyond representation. New Delhi’s realpolitik, strategic, domestic and international considerations play a significant role in its AU call.

The G20 is essentially an economic club, representing approximately 85% of global GDP. If the AU joined it, the G21 would be even more representative, Africa’s population constituting 17% of humanity, and its economy adding $3 trillion into the G21 pot. And with its inordinate share of minerals powering the digital age, it is Africa’s strategic importance to the future that would be at the heart of the G21’s raison d’etre.

India’s Domestic and Global Quest

India’s AU request plays into Modi’s bigger agenda to project himself to domestic audiences as an influential global figure by fusing India’s prestige as host of the G20 meetings with his own as current G20 president. Karishma Mehrotra and Gerry Shih have commented on India’s unprecedented PR campaign around this year’s summit: projecting a hologram onto Humayun’s Tomb; parading G20-themed floats at local religious festivals; incorporating the G20 logo into nationwide pupils’ exams; launching a national billboard campaign themed ‘India: Mother of Democracy’, all of which raise the ruling BJP’s Hindu nationalist jingoism to new heights.

Part of Modi’s goal is to position himself as the voice of the developing world. Indeed, this quest carries echoes of India’s anti-colonialist history as a bulwark of the Non-Aligned Movement, recalling first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru’s foreign policy approach.

Prime Minister Modi emphasised the connection between being the voice of the Global South and his support for the African Union’s membership, stating in a speech, “Giving a voice to the Global South is the way forward; that is why I firmly believe African Union be given full membership of G20.” This sentiment reflects India’s commitment to advocating the interests and representation of developing nations on the international stage.

Modi’s AU advocacy aligned as it is with Washington’s entrenched China antipathy, may be an attempt to balance the latter’s growing influence, cultivated over the past two decades via what some detractors describe as ‘debt trap diplomacy’. Given, however, that both India and China are BRICS members, Modi’s support for AU membership at the G20 will ultimately count as part of the longer struggle to rebalance global power in favour of the South. In realpolitik terms, however, it allows New Delhi autonomously to pursue global influence and leverage, furthering its geopolitical goals.

Contrary to India’s insistence on G20’s enlargement, India does not welcome enlargement in BRICS – a quintet organisation in which Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa are members. This is partly due to the fact that any possible BRICS engagement will not favour India, but will likely increase Chinese influence on the bloc. Forty nations have shown interest in joining BRICS. Among these possible members, African nations have shown great interest, such as Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Egypt, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Comoros, and Gabon. Because the influence of India might decrease with the enlargement of BRICS, Modi does not show a similar embracement of the Global South’s representation.

Moreover, looking at this year’s G20 guest list, Indian strategic choices betray its domestic preoccupations. India invited Oman and the United Arab Emirates, two Gulf countries hosting thousands of Indian migrant workers whose remittances constitute an important source of family and wider support. Considering the region is already represented by Saudi Arabia in the G20, the choice is more about bilateral relations than regional representation. Similarly, the invitation of Bangladesh to the summit shows the alliance’s role in the invitation.

Most of the G20 members declared their support for the African Union’s membership application. For example, Canada, Brazil, China, Russia, South Africa, France, the US, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, India, Japan, and Italy, already announced that they will support the AU’s membership. Should it happen, it will be the first-ever enlargement since the club’s foundation in 1999. Indeed, this will test their honesty and a chance for better global representation in important institutions such as G20. Moreover, because G20 discusses issues that affect the continent significantly, such as climate, food security, and trade, it is important for around 50 countries to be represented by more than just South Africa.

 

What next in Chakwera’s anti-corruption crusade in Malawi?

 

A scandal from the last regime forced the president to fire senior officials, suspend his VP and risk breaking the ruling coalition.   

he arrest of Malawi’s Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) Director General, Martha Chizuma, last December, following a criminal defamation complaint from Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Steven Kayuni, reveals how delicate and fragmented government systems can be when it comes to rooting out corruption.

In a January 2022 leaked audio, Chizuma alleged she was finding it extremely hard to make progress against the corrupt, as there was little support from the presidency and some government agencies, notably the DPP.

The allegations and, perhaps, the leaked audio itself, infuriated President Lazarus Chakwera. He issued Chizuma a strong warning. Later, Chakwera would say that Chizuma regretted her actions and that he had forgiven her.

Until recently, to prosecute a corruption case, the ACB had to obtain consent from the DPP. That changed last September, when Parliament amended the Corrupt Practices Act (CPA) to remove the relevant provision. Proponents of the amendment said the previous piece of legislation delayed cases, leaving the anti-graft body with a backlog of cases awaiting trial.

The amendment came amid bad blood between the two agencies, with the DPP Kayuni refusing to grant the ACB consent to prosecute a case involving a British national and longtime security contractor, Zuneth Sattar, and businessperson Ashok Nair. Also known as Ashok Sreedharan, Nair is a close associate of Sattar, whose relations with the previous regime of Peter Mutharika made him notorious in the corridors of power. Sattar’s companies were awarded tenders in the Malawi Police Service, the Malawi Prisons Service and the Army. There are allegations that, through Nair, he has been bribing public officers in exchange for government contracts.

Chizuma’s leaked audio has been a bone of contention between her and the DPP. Police arrested and charged Chizuma with making use of speech capable of prejudicing a person against a party to judicial proceedings, contrary to section 131 (1) d of the penal code.

Police spokesperson, Peter Kalaya, said: “High Court Judge, Anabel Mtalimanja, ruled in September 2022 that any individual or party that felt aggrieved by the contents of the leaked audio clip could proceed to complain to police for criminal action against the ACB director general.”

Western embassies condemned the heavy-handedness and unorthodox manner in which Chizuma was arrested. They threatened to issue economic sanctions and travel bans against government officials.

Chakwera fires DPP

Angered with the development, and under pressure from his Western funders, President Chakwera suspended Kayuni. He also instituted a Commission of Inquiry on the arrest of Chizuma.

In its recommendations, the Commission censured Kayuni for bringing a personal complaint to the police in his capacity as DPP.

“I consider this a great failure for Kayuni and a great disappointment to me,” said Chakwera. “As such, to prevent him from using a public office to settle personal injury, I have removed Kayuni from office with immediate effect and I thank him for his many years of service.”

Another bone of contention was the lack of trust among offices mandated to fight corruption. Releasing its findings in January 2023, the Edward Twea-led Commission of Inquiry recommended that the DPP and ACB collaborate to complete prosecution of major corruption cases to restore public confidence in the institutions.

The Commission found Chizuma culpable in the audio tape saga; all charges against her were, however, dropped. Her lawyer, Martha Kaukonde, claimed the inquiry disregarded her client’s testimony.

“My client is obviously disappointed that what she presented to the Commission regarding the main issue that the inquiry [has] to do with the manner and appropriateness of the arrest, was not presented,” Kaukonde said.

No to selective justice

President Chakwera won the presidency on an anti-corruption platform. He pledged to deal with corruption with the seriousness it needed. But two years down the line, there are allegations the fight against corruption has become a political tool to silence critics.

The Catholic Church, which wields significant moral authority in Malawi, said in a statement last year that no one should be pressurised, intimidated or influenced by threats, or by any other means in the carrying out of their work for the good of the country.

“We plead, in the interest of building a more just and transparent Malawi that benefits all its citizens, that any of the investigations or cases which the ACB is dealing with are not in any way obstructed or influenced. Let no suspect, however powerful, wealthy or who their connection are, be shielded or protected provided that he or she is given proper recourse to the legal processes of the courts,” said the Catholic bishops in a statement.

On 25 November, 2022 Vice-President Saulos Chilima was arrested by the ACB. The bureau said it had arrested him on allegations that between March and October 2021, Chilima received $280,000 and other items from Sattar as a reward for helping the businessman’s companies – Xavier Limited and Malachitte FZE – secure government contracts.

Chilima was charged with three counts of corruption: two for receiving advantage for using influence in regard to government contracts; and one for failing to make a full report to a police officer or an officer of the ACB that an advantage had been corruptly given.

In June last year, Chakwera fired some senior government officials who were involved in suspicious dealings with Sattar. The ACB found that 84 individuals allegedly received money from the businessman. Out these, 13 have been extensively investigated, including the vice president. Chakwera said, constitutionally, he was unable to remove Chilima from office.

“As for the Vice President, his office is unique in that the Constitution does not provide for his suspension or removal from it by the President, because he holds that office by the will of Malawian voters, which I respect,” said the president. “As such, the best I can do for now, which is what I have decided to do, is to withhold from his office any delegated duties while waiting for the Bureau to substantiate its allegations against him and to make known its course of action in relation to such.”

From the arrest of Chilima and Chizuma, and the sacking of Kayuni as DPP and many who are to follow, the cardinal point is that President Chakwera is finding it tough going in the fight against corruption. While some of his former ministers were removed from office on corruption allegations, their cases are stuck in the courts.

Critics want Chakwera to go beyond political rhetoric and deal with corruption decisively.  The opposition has complained of selective justice and politics of retribution after former ruling Democratic Progressive Party politicians and sympathizers were targeted in the anti-graft fight, whose cases range from alleged corruption to abuse of public office. However, the president has to play a delicate balancing act. Chastising his Tonse coalition partners risks straining its cohesion ahead of next year’s parliamentary and local government elections. Doing anything less would wreck his anti-corruption credentials and torpedo his chances for a second term.

Did Nigeria’s election tech fail or was it sabotaged?

U.S. Hailed Nigeria Election Results While Election Observers Cried Foul

When and how Washington congratulates foreign leaders on contentious election victories matters.

As independent U.S. election observers raised alarm bells about widespread voting irregularities in Nigeria’s Feb. 25 presidential elections, the U.S. State Department was singing an entirely different tune, congratulating Bola Ahmed Tinubu as the electoral victor and hailing a “competitive election” that “represents a new period for Nigerian politics and democracy.”

The stark split screen in how independent election observers and the State Department responded to Nigeria’s election caused anger and backlash in Washington among other U.S. agencies and Congress, which criticized the State Department for being too quick to endorse an election victor just as opposition leaders were mounting legal challenges to contest the outcome.

“While other world powers were cautiously assessing all the voting irregularities and withholding the congrats messages, we just decided to skip ahead a few steps and tout Tinubu as the winner, and I just can’t understand why,” fumed one U.S. official who works on African policy, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “Given the stakes here, [it’s] hard to see how that wasn’t just a really bad idea,” said another U.S.

Nigeria’s presidential vote constituted one of the most closely watched and significant elections of the year. The 70-year-old Tinubu—former governor of Nigeria’s Lagos state, who is seen as a wealthy kleptocratic kingmaker in Nigerian politics—competed against leading opposition candidate Atiku Abubakar and third-party candidate Peter Obi. The elections were marred by widespread accounts of voter irregularities, sporadic violence at polling stations, disorderly delays, and other logistical issues.

“These were the first elections of the year in the largest democracy on the youngest continent,” said Mark Green, president and CEO of the Wilson Center and former chief of the U.S. Agency for International Development. “They’re important for Nigeria obviously and the consolidation of democracy. They’re important to the region because stability in Nigeria is the linchpin to stability in that whole region.”

The U.S. message to Tinubu, which acknowledged frustrations for Nigerians and shortcomings in the process, stands in sharp contrast to how the United States reacted to Kenya’s 2022 presidential election. In that case, Washington waited until the Kenyan Supreme Court upheld the results of the election—nearly a full month later—before issuing a statement congratulating William Ruto on his win.

Critics of the administration’s stance on the Nigerian election argue that a statement from the State Department isn’t just a statement. The United States has significant political and diplomatic clout in West Africa, and some U.S. officials who spoke to Foreign Policy said its decision to publicly congratulate Tinubu before legal and legitimate election challenges could be played out could indirectly undermine those challenges before, they even begin.

“The ongoing electoral process in Nigeria is widely viewed as deeply flawed by election observers and many Nigerians,” said U.S. Sen. Jim Risch, the top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “It is disappointing to see the administration rush to embrace the result while the full picture of what occurred during this electoral process is yet to be seen.”

That’s one of the reasons why so many experts and officials paid attention to the State Department’s March 1 statement on the Nigerian election, which led with congratulations for Tinubu and Nigeria’s democratic transition before acknowledging the concerns and shortcomings in the elections.

Young voters put their faith in digital technology. But at polling units nationwide, many were transported to an election's twilight zone. 

 Victor Madu, a 25-year-old part-time student at the National Open University of Nigeria, always believed that he had no business with elections in the country. His position was based on two premises: the absence of credible candidates, and the level of malpractice historically synonymous with the country’s electoral process.

But in June 2022, a few months after President Muhammadu Buhari signed a new electoral bill into law, he had a change of heart and decided to endure the long and gruelling process of registering and collecting a Permanent Voters Card (PVC), which would make him eligible to vote: “On two occasions, I had to bribe officials before I got it. The first time I paid N1,500 ($3.40) and later N2,000 ($4.3),” Victor recalls. He took consolation in the belief that as long as his vote counted, it was a small sacrifice to pay.

After getting his PVC, he began to mobilise friends and neighbours, many of whom also shared his old sentiments about the conduct of elections in the country. At 7 am on 25 February, the day of the presidential election, he set off to vote, determined that no one in his community would fail to exercise their civic duty.

“Our morale was very high. We were confident that the [amendments] to the electoral law would make the difference,” he recalls.

The game changer

Since independence, Nigeria’s governance institutions have failed to meet the challenge of conducting credible elections. But the introduction of the new electoral law last year led citizens to believe that an answer had finally been found, leading to increased interest and trust in this most discredited of processes. This enthusiasm was even more evident among young people seeking to make a change.

This sudden trust and the ability of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was, among other things, inspired by the fact that technological innovations had been introduced to address the slew of malpractices that typify elections in Nigeria. The most prominent of these innovations is the Bimodal Voters Accreditation System (BVAS) and the INEC Result Viewing (IReV) portal.

A digital device that authenticates and accredits voters via fingerprints and facial recognition, the BVAS replaced the manual voter verification, which had been grossly abused in the past, notably allowing multiple voting by a single voter. The device also captures images of the polling unit result sheets (Form EC8A) and uploads the image online. The INEC Results Viewing portal (IREV), the central repository where all results sheets from each polling unit would be uploaded immediately after votes had been counted, allowed voters to view the results. It was, therefore, impossible for the result to be changed – in theory, at least.

Despite some fears about the effectiveness of the system, at the end of the voter registration exercise last August, INEC announced that it had registered an additional 10.5 million voters. 84% were aged 34 years and under and brought the total number of registered voters to more than 94 million. After decades of deepening voter apathy, there was a sense of real optimism in the electoral system.

To ensure this new introduction is effective, the electoral law made it statutory for the results in all polling units to be electronically transmitted immediately after the announcement of results.

‘Riding on chaos and crisis’

“The first sign that the electoral body would fall short of our expectations came on the evening of the day of the election,” Victor explains. “Immediately after votes were counted, the BVAS machine stopped working and they [INEC officials] said they couldn’t log in to upload again. Some said they did not have [mobile phone] data.”

To ensure the results in the various polling units in his community at Satellite ward, Amuwo-Odofin local government, Lagos State, were uploaded, Victor and his friends, who he had mobilised to come and vote, turned on their mobile hotspot for the officials to upload the results. “But after connecting, the machine didn’t work. This thing happened in all the polling units in my area. I was moving around, helping people locate their polling units so I went around and it was the same all over. At that moment, we began to suspect it was a conspiracy. But we had to let the INEC officials leave for security reasons and to avoid violence.”

From that moment, Victor and his friends began to check the IReV portal, anticipating the uploading of results. This did not happen until two days later, on Monday 27 February. It turned out to be the least of their problems. The first results they saw on the portal was that of No 4, Baale street I, PU016, Satellite ward 7. To their utmost surprise, the result uploaded for their polling unit was that of Gitata in Karu local government, Nasarawa state – a polling unit located at least 704 km away.

“I was disappointed when I saw it,” Uche Okoye, one of Victor’s friends, says. “Up till now, I have not gone to market because the shock never leave my body,” the 34-year cosmetics seller added in pidgin on Wednesday afternoon.

At another polling unit in their community, located at “End of Olanrewaju street, Satellite ward”, the result of another polling unit in Nasarawa State was also uploaded.

However, Victor explained that when he checked the portal again on Wednesday morning – by which time the ruling party’s Bola Tinubu had declared the winner – they had replaced the results with the original ones. “But they have already declared a winner. So how did they get that? What caused this?” he asked rhetorically. He was silent for a while, and then said, “The whole thing was rigged.”

Hundreds of cases similar to these were identified across the country and shared by disappointed voters on various social media platforms, leading to questions about how transparent the process was.

“Our democracy should have matured past this particular stage. The fact that we are still facing all these irregularities is disappointing,” Nimah Arigbabu, a public policy analyst at NG Voices, said.

She explained that the introduction of BVAS was necessitated by the need to ensure the mandate of the people at every election is protected. “But what is obvious now is that we enjoy riding on chaos and crisis.”

“It just goes on to show that at this point, we have further weakened our democratic system. We might not feel it yet, but at some point in the future, we are going to come back and regret this.”

A different pattern

David Akindolire, a 26-year-old lawyer, voted for the first time this year. At his polling unit, voting did not start until almost noon; INEC had directed polling units to open at 8.30 am. The officials arrived very late. For hours, David and many others braved the heat and the chaos around them. At multiple polling units a few miles away from theirs, political thugs disrupted voting exercises, threatened voters, and even attempted to steal a ballot box.

But despite this, he stayed on, determined to exercise his civic duty. “More than 90 of us later voted. And the number of voters registered there is about four times that,” he recalled.  “Some people left before the officials arrived.”

David’s experience mirrors a pattern of experiences recorded by several voters, especially young first-time voters, raising questions about the low turnout of voters announced by INEC, and a growing suspicion of organised vote suppression. At the end of the exercise, the voter turnout of 27% was the lowest in the country’s history. It goes against a widely held perception of a historically high turnout.

Experts have identified the late arrival of officials as one of the factors responsible for the fall in voter turnout recorded in the county’s closest presidential race since its return to democracy in 1999.

Olasupo Abideen, the director of Brain Builder Youth Development Initiative, explains that the recorded turnout this time around broke with the pattern of declining voter turnout established in previous elections.

“As an organisation, we did a technical analysis based on the voter turnout from 1999-2019 and we discovered that the [official] figures are because our elections have always been marred with irregularities,” explains Olasupo, who headed his organisation’s Election Situation Room. He is suggesting that the lower turnout figures given for these elections could be attributed to the digital technology, which prevented multiple voting.

He notes that with the introduction of the BVAS, “we are now seeing the technical number of voters in the country”, meaning more accurate figures, an indication that the credibility of all elections between 2003 and 2019 is questionable. “Like I have been telling people, those that came out to vote this time around are more than those in previous elections.”

Nimah, who concurs with Olasupo’s analysis on the role of the BVAS in eradicating bloated voter figures, noted that a preliminary analysis revealed that young people came out to vote but older ones did not, adding that in the northern part of the country, a significant fraction of the population liked neither of the two Muslim presidential candidates on the ballot – the APC’s Tinubu and the main opposition PDP’s Atiku Abubakar.

Amid all this, first-time voters like Uche say they have started weighing the option of never participating in future elections since their vote won’t count. But experts disagree with this course of action.

“Young people should not give up. We’ll continue until we make headway,” Nimah maintains.

The activities of over 80 active militant groups have already pushed Nigeria to the brink. How will the new president respond?

 

Awaiting the winner of the 25 February elections is a raft of challenges, none more consequential than the security crisis whose lethality and extent, especially over the past three years, raised existential questions about the federation. There are currently dozens of armed groups across Nigeria, some of which have the capacity to disrupt the elections at the local and regional levels, clouding the results and triggering the kind of political disputes that could leave the entire electoral process in disarray.

In the northeast where a 14-year insurgency rages, the battle against Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP) will test the limits of the incoming administration – in the same manner it has tested the previous two. The persistence of the Boko Haram insurgency, which began in 2009, suggests the need to rethink Nigeria’s entire counter-insurgency strategy.

Outgoing president Muhammadu Buhari pursued a strategy of escalation: ever more resources were thrown at the police and military in the conflict-affected regions, with ever diminishing returns.

Escalation is one of four possible strategic choices available to warring parties during civil conflict. Other options include continuing current hostilities, seeking allies, and starting formal negotiations.

Will Nigeria’s next president follow a different strategic direction? Below, we examine what counter-insurgency programmes the four leading presidential candidates, have conceived.

The candidates’ positions

Bola Ahmed Tinubu (APC): New directions?

In December 2020, the ruling All Progressive Congress candidate called for a rethink of the government’s security strategy. Recognising the persistence of Boko Haram, he remarked: “In such situations what we do is re-plan our strategy.”

So is a fresh approach in the offing from the ruling party’s candidate? Framing the insurgency as a security problem bred by a socio-economic crisis, Tinubu in his manifesto outlines the need to create new jobs, provide training to young people and make business loans available to stimulate growth. These socio-economic plans will then “be complemented with a complete overhaul of the nation’s existing security architecture”.

In 2013, Tinubu urged the Goodluck Jonathan administration to accept that a solely military response to Boko Haram was “inadequate”.

Our assessment: Tentative, but novel thinking. Tinubu is unlikely to try and escalate the counter-insurgency. Although Tinubu does not discuss entering formal negotiations with Boko Haram, he appears to be the most open to alternative solutions to the conflict.

Atiku Abubakar (PDP): More of the same?

With a manifesto preoccupied with economic recovery, it’s hardly surprising that main opposition People’s Democratic Party (PDP) candidate opens the rather brief chapter on security by focusing on economic growth and employment. Atiku soon reveals his affinity for a security sector-led approach, however: he intends to recruit an additional one million police officers and, while he doesn’t cost it, will also improve the welfare of security personnel. This will be complemented by training and retraining personnel in the latest counter-terrorism practices.

On the campaign trail, Abubakar has told voters that “the lasting solution to the Boko Haram insurgency is strong leadership”.

Our assessment: More of the same. Atiku is likely to pursue a similar approach to Buhari – that of continuing hostilities and possibly military escalation. Many of his security pledges involve increasing resources for the police and military.

Peter Gregory Obi (Labour Party): Thinking outside the box?

In his manifesto, the Labour Party candidate outlines four steps that he would implement to tackle extremism and insurgency. The first is strengthening regional cooperation among Lake Chad Basin states: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and his native Nigeria. His approach builds on the existing Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF) involving the four West African states. While bedevilled by inconsistent commitment and bumpy cooperation among member states, recent successes against both the ISWAP and more dominant Jamā’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihād faction of Boko Haram suggest slow steady progress.

Our assessment: More of the same, with tweaks. Given his roots in the PDP, it is perhaps not surprising that Obi’s security approach has echoes of Atiku’s – increased deployment, more training and equipping of personnel. What is different is his emphasis on regional cooperation, though his reliance on the existing MNJTF is consistent with his conventional approach.

Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso (NNPP): Escalation

The New Nigerian People’s Party (NNPP) candidate and former defense minister has a “special approach”. He plans to expand the Nigerian military by recruiting an additional 750,000 personnel bringing the total to one million in active service with new recruits being largely drawn from Nigeria’s high number of unemployed youths.

While Kwankwaso does address the socio-economic well-being of Nigerians in his manifesto’s security section, the emphasis is on the recruitment of personnel and training of troops. Kwankwaso’s manifesto is the only one of the four that discusses changes to the mandatory one-year National Service and plans to revitalize Nigeria’s defence sector.

Our assessment: More of the same, with tweaks. Kwankwaso’s intention to improve cooperation between the military and private sector is less a bid to strengthen the capabilities of the military than a tacit acknowledgement of the weaknesses of the current system.

The missing piece: Deradicalisation

None of the four manifestos refers to deradicalization as a key step in improving security in Nigeria, not just in relation to Boko Haram and other Islamist groups like ISWAP but in the context of other anti-state movements such as the insurgency in the Niger Delta which began in 2005.

The reluctance to discuss deradicalisation is likely the result of the lack of trust between local communities and reformed Boko Haram fighters. In 2016, the Buhari administration launched “Operation Safe Corridor”, a DRR programme (i.e. Deradicalise, Rehabilitate and Re-integrate) that has seen more than 1,000 former jihadists successfully graduate. Despite this, the International Crisis Group reports that the programme has been plagued by numerous issues including low levels of public support, overcrowding and poor conditions at detention centres.

Research carried out by Tarela Juliet Ike, a Lecturer in Criminology and Policing at Teesside University, shows that there is significant distrust in the deradicalisation process in local communities. This was due to the perception that the Nigerian government has not provided enough resources to the deradicalisation and rehabilitation stages of the programme which had led to further questions about the effectiveness of the criminal justice system in Nigeria more generally. Questions over the legitimacy of the state are not unique to the Boko Haram insurgency; they are a recurrent theme in the Niger Delta as well as with separatist movements elsewhere, notably the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the South-east, and the Oduduwa irredentists in the Southwest.

In December 2022, the outgoing Buhari government announced plans for two new rehabilitation centres with funding of US$5.2 million. The new administration should maintain these plans. Improving the conditions of detention centres as well as expanding the availability of essential psychotherapy services for those undergoing deradicalisation will challenge perceptions that DRR programmes are too under-resourced to make a lasting positive impact. Rehabilitation centers, when given the right level of investment and resources, can be successful in supporting the deradicalization process as seen in the case of the Serendi Rehabilitation Centre in Mogadishu, which has supported former al-Shabaab militants in their transition back into Somali society.

Forgive but never forget: time for a TRC?

As well as demonstrating that adequate resources have been channeled into the deradicalization and rehabilitation process, the final part of the programme, reintegration, will require fresh ideas to bring about greater coordination and input from local communities to help foster trust.

One possible solution could be the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a form of restorative justice. A TRC would provide a safe forum for local communities to hear former insurgents take accountability for their role in Boko Haram’s destructive attacks. This would tackle the problem of indifference shown by local communities towards repenting ex-jihadists – an issue identified by Tarela Juliet Ike. Reconciliation through an appropriate and recognized body like the TRC would provide local communities with a sense of restorative justice that is needed for reintegration to be successful.

Beyond Boko Haram

A successful DRR programme in Nigeria’s northeast could lay the foundation for similar programmes being implemented in other parts of the country where security challenges also persist. In 2019, the Niger Delta saw an increase in insecurity in a region where militants regularly target critical infrastructure for the oil and gas sector.

Context is important, however. While some lessons from a Boko Haram DRR programme may be applied in the Niger Delta or in other cases of violent extremism, each programme needs to be adequately adapted to its own context. There simply cannot be a one-size-fits-all approach towards the complex process of deradicalisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration.