How did the bloody revolution in
Zanzibar in 1964 affect Kenya and especially the tradition of tribal
appointments that persists to this day?
It is fairly easy to criticize without
understanding things properly and that is exactly what Mwai Kibaki did before
2002 and the next president of Kenya had better not make the same mistake. The
lives and livelihood of millions of Kenyans depends on this mistake NOT being
repeated.
And so in this post I will think aloud in an effort to understand all that is wrong with decision-making at the executive level in this country so that the next president of Kenya deliberately takes a very different path. This is a preamble to one of the most disturbing posts I have ever penned here.
Why are all my posts these days about the presidency, I hear you asking? Fair question.
It is because I am of the view that what will save Kenya is decisive leadership at the top (at the executive level). I have never believed in management by committee which is exactly what parliament is. And I am not trying to pour cold water on the heroic deed in the august house last night.
For starters it is important to appreciate the fact that Kenya is exactly where she is today mainly because of executive decisions made within the walls of State House over the past couple of years since early 2003. Don’t forget that the executive in Kenya is so terribly powerful that even Kings from ancient times brought back to life today to see for themselves the power wielded by the president of Kenya would turn red with envy.
And so in this post I will think aloud in an effort to understand all that is wrong with decision-making at the executive level in this country so that the next president of Kenya deliberately takes a very different path. This is a preamble to one of the most disturbing posts I have ever penned here.
Why are all my posts these days about the presidency, I hear you asking? Fair question.
It is because I am of the view that what will save Kenya is decisive leadership at the top (at the executive level). I have never believed in management by committee which is exactly what parliament is. And I am not trying to pour cold water on the heroic deed in the august house last night.
For starters it is important to appreciate the fact that Kenya is exactly where she is today mainly because of executive decisions made within the walls of State House over the past couple of years since early 2003. Don’t forget that the executive in Kenya is so terribly powerful that even Kings from ancient times brought back to life today to see for themselves the power wielded by the president of Kenya would turn red with envy.
Have you ever wondered why it is that decisions made by the executive just
make you wonder what kind of advisors are surrounding the president and if they
really do have something in the space between their ears? Have you wondered why
it is that certain key posts in government cannot be filled by any other tribe
outside GEMA or the Mount Kenya tribes as some would like to call them? A good
example is the Finance docket. What tribe is the minister of Finance? What tribe
was his predecessor? And what tribe was the acting Finance minister before the
current appointment? What tribe is the PS? What about the Central Bank of Kenya?
What tribe is the governor who was appointed instead of a very capable and brave
Kenyan woman called Mrs Mwatela? Remember her?
But closer to the subject of my post today let us take a look at security. What tribe is the head of intelligence in Kenya? What tribe is the new police commissioner? What tribe is the minister in charge of internal security? Did you know that all the ministers in this docket during the Kibaki administration have come from the same tribe? Mere coincidence? Or will you choose to give me an Alfred-Mutua-spin answer to counter my facts. Remember the one about the government having more Luhyas than any other tribe according to a Mutua audit. That made me think that maybe the government employs too many watchmen and cooks. Excuse my joke but my mother hails from the land of ingokho, feelanga free and natuma-salamu so I guess I am allowed this joke.
Kenyans need to know that there is a good reason to everything and many of the answers can be found in history. As I told a friend the other day, to understand the Kibaki administration you need to understand the Kenyatta administration because the difference between the two is continuously blurring before my very eyes every day.
To shed more light here, lets go back to 1964. The then infant Kenyatta government was just beginning to settle in and the mood deep inside that administration at the time is important to note here. That mood was ruled by one central emotion; fear.
Let me explain. In that year some rather frightening events unfolded in rapid succession. The year started with a very bloody coup in neighbouring Zanizibar. The coup was orchestrated by a Ugandan policeman called Okello. One description of the events in Zanzibar in Januray 1964 sums it all up rather neatly. They said that there were “rivers of Arab blood flowing on the streets of the Stone town.” Closer to Nairobi, this was closely followed by a very serious army mutiny at the Lanet barracks in Nakuru. Details of it are still very scanty to this day, but Tom Mboya played a key role in finally getting things under control. Read more about this in an earlier Kumekucha post HERE.
Events across Africa and especially in Nigeria where military coups were happening at a speed that is almost similar to the way that country produces movies these days, were causing even more fear in the corridors of power in Nairobi.
The writing was clearly on the wall. The priority had to be how to survive. Development and fair appointments based only on merit would have to take a back seat. It was clear that any wise African president had to find people they could trust and preferably folks they could speak to in their mother tongue. And this had nothing to do with properly understanding instructions. This led to a very dangerous precedent where the president’s closest advisors increasingly became people form his community and ultimately from his village. To prove it, it is instructive to note that at the height of the Kenyatta administration, oaths were taken by senior offivcials in government and the security forces to ensure that the presidency would never cross River Chania (that is the river that divides Kikuyus from Kiambu with their close brothers from Nyeri.
What many Kenyans may have not realized at the time is the grave danger of having all your closest advisors being people from your village who all think and reason the same. What do you think that does to the quality of decision-making?
I was watching a DVD of my favourite TV show, 24 the other day and in it the president of the United States had all his advisors around him and was listening to two sharply opposing views on how to handle a major crisis. That is how it has always been and should be since ancient times. It is how great Kings like King David and King Solomon (the wisest of them all) went about their business successfully.
If you really think about it, you will now begin to realize why the quality of decision-making in the Kibaki administration has been wanting and has often disappointed even his closest allies.
Imagine the situation in State House Nairobi shortly before the 2007 presidential election “results” were released. I would bet you a nyama choma lunch of my favourite juicy goat meat that all those around the table were in agreement that trouble would come from “those stone-throwing Jaruos who carry stones in brief cases to Gor Mahia soccer matches at the stadium.” What do you think they would have said if somebody as much as suggested that the whole country was in a foul mood after a presidential campaign that started immediately after referendum vote over a new constitution? Do you think you would have been given a hearing if you had pointed out that the Kalenjin community could cause serious trouble in the Rift Valley? How many Kenyan lives did that decision cost? Ooops I know figures vary from a paltry 600 to the Kumekucha 5,000.
Now imagine the situation in State House shortly before the decisive cabinet meeting recently to pass a decision over the Hague-versus-local-tribunal-to-try-post-election-violence-suspects issue. I can almost hear several people I know telling the president; “I don’t see any crisis here. You are the president. Tell them that it will all be sorted out by the Truth Justice and Reconciliation commission. What can they do?” In this decision lies a grave danger and a common trend within the corridors of power since 2003. This trend is where decisions are made that instead of solving the problem escalate it while postponing the explosion to a later date. That is exactly what happened when the Kibaki administration ignored intense pressure to postpone the referendum on the new constitution in 2005 and instead concentrating on cooling temperatures countrywide. The decision to go ahead with that referendum postponed the explosion to a much bigger one in early 2008.
But closer to the subject of my post today let us take a look at security. What tribe is the head of intelligence in Kenya? What tribe is the new police commissioner? What tribe is the minister in charge of internal security? Did you know that all the ministers in this docket during the Kibaki administration have come from the same tribe? Mere coincidence? Or will you choose to give me an Alfred-Mutua-spin answer to counter my facts. Remember the one about the government having more Luhyas than any other tribe according to a Mutua audit. That made me think that maybe the government employs too many watchmen and cooks. Excuse my joke but my mother hails from the land of ingokho, feelanga free and natuma-salamu so I guess I am allowed this joke.
Kenyans need to know that there is a good reason to everything and many of the answers can be found in history. As I told a friend the other day, to understand the Kibaki administration you need to understand the Kenyatta administration because the difference between the two is continuously blurring before my very eyes every day.
To shed more light here, lets go back to 1964. The then infant Kenyatta government was just beginning to settle in and the mood deep inside that administration at the time is important to note here. That mood was ruled by one central emotion; fear.
Let me explain. In that year some rather frightening events unfolded in rapid succession. The year started with a very bloody coup in neighbouring Zanizibar. The coup was orchestrated by a Ugandan policeman called Okello. One description of the events in Zanzibar in Januray 1964 sums it all up rather neatly. They said that there were “rivers of Arab blood flowing on the streets of the Stone town.” Closer to Nairobi, this was closely followed by a very serious army mutiny at the Lanet barracks in Nakuru. Details of it are still very scanty to this day, but Tom Mboya played a key role in finally getting things under control. Read more about this in an earlier Kumekucha post HERE.
Events across Africa and especially in Nigeria where military coups were happening at a speed that is almost similar to the way that country produces movies these days, were causing even more fear in the corridors of power in Nairobi.
The writing was clearly on the wall. The priority had to be how to survive. Development and fair appointments based only on merit would have to take a back seat. It was clear that any wise African president had to find people they could trust and preferably folks they could speak to in their mother tongue. And this had nothing to do with properly understanding instructions. This led to a very dangerous precedent where the president’s closest advisors increasingly became people form his community and ultimately from his village. To prove it, it is instructive to note that at the height of the Kenyatta administration, oaths were taken by senior offivcials in government and the security forces to ensure that the presidency would never cross River Chania (that is the river that divides Kikuyus from Kiambu with their close brothers from Nyeri.
What many Kenyans may have not realized at the time is the grave danger of having all your closest advisors being people from your village who all think and reason the same. What do you think that does to the quality of decision-making?
I was watching a DVD of my favourite TV show, 24 the other day and in it the president of the United States had all his advisors around him and was listening to two sharply opposing views on how to handle a major crisis. That is how it has always been and should be since ancient times. It is how great Kings like King David and King Solomon (the wisest of them all) went about their business successfully.
If you really think about it, you will now begin to realize why the quality of decision-making in the Kibaki administration has been wanting and has often disappointed even his closest allies.
Imagine the situation in State House Nairobi shortly before the 2007 presidential election “results” were released. I would bet you a nyama choma lunch of my favourite juicy goat meat that all those around the table were in agreement that trouble would come from “those stone-throwing Jaruos who carry stones in brief cases to Gor Mahia soccer matches at the stadium.” What do you think they would have said if somebody as much as suggested that the whole country was in a foul mood after a presidential campaign that started immediately after referendum vote over a new constitution? Do you think you would have been given a hearing if you had pointed out that the Kalenjin community could cause serious trouble in the Rift Valley? How many Kenyan lives did that decision cost? Ooops I know figures vary from a paltry 600 to the Kumekucha 5,000.
Now imagine the situation in State House shortly before the decisive cabinet meeting recently to pass a decision over the Hague-versus-local-tribunal-to-try-post-election-violence-suspects issue. I can almost hear several people I know telling the president; “I don’t see any crisis here. You are the president. Tell them that it will all be sorted out by the Truth Justice and Reconciliation commission. What can they do?” In this decision lies a grave danger and a common trend within the corridors of power since 2003. This trend is where decisions are made that instead of solving the problem escalate it while postponing the explosion to a later date. That is exactly what happened when the Kibaki administration ignored intense pressure to postpone the referendum on the new constitution in 2005 and instead concentrating on cooling temperatures countrywide. The decision to go ahead with that referendum postponed the explosion to a much bigger one in early 2008.
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