The July 9, 2026 Declaration of Reconciliation: Will Zanzibar Finally Institutionalize What History Has Repeatedly Deferred?
Mussa Shehe
On July 9, 2026, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and ACT Wazalendo signed the Declaration of Reconciliation. The event deserves recognition. At a time when political disagreements around the world are increasingly descending into polarization, any commitment to dialogue rather than confrontation is a welcome development.
Yet the significance of this declaration cannot be understood in isolation. For those familiar with Zanzibar's political history, the more consequential question is not whether the declaration is commendable. Rather, it is whether Zanzibar is finally prepared to institutionalize reconciliation instead of repeatedly negotiating it.
The restoration of multiparty politics in 1992 was expected to usher in a democratic era founded on electoral competition, political tolerance, and the consent of the governed. Instead, much of Zanzibar's subsequent political history has been characterized by contested elections, declining public trust, political polarization, and recurring attempts to restore confidence through negotiated settlements.
It was under these circumstances that Muafaka I (1999) and Muafaka II (2001) were negotiated. These agreements did not emerge because political differences had disappeared; they emerged because all parties recognized that dialogue had become preferable to prolonged political confrontation. The reconciliation initiative of 2009 subsequently led to the 2010 referendum and the establishment of the Government of National Unity (GNU), a constitutional innovation widely regarded as one of the most significant milestones in Zanzibar's contemporary political development.
The Declaration of July 9 therefore joins a long historical tradition of negotiated political settlements in Zanzibar. Unsurprisingly, public reactions to the agreement have reflected both hope and caution.
Commenting on the Declaration, a resident of Stone Town said it was still too early to be optimistic, emphasizing that only time would determine whether the agreement would be implemented and achieve its intended objectives.
A supporter of one of Zanzibar's political parties, who received the Declaration cautiously, argued that the changing political dynamics across Tanzania, together with the desire to make Zanzibar a "future political heaven," had created the conditions that made the agreement possible.
Other political figures welcomed the initiative by calling for reconciliation under the simple but powerful slogan, "Let us forgive one another and build together." Beyond the political arena, the language of reconciliation also found expression in religious discourse. During Friday prayers on July 10, 2026, one imam drew on the historic reconciliation between the Banu Aus and the Banu Khazraj, urging the people of Zanzibar to emulate their example of unity and reconciliation in the interest of lasting peace.
Not everyone, however, was prepared to embrace either optimism or pessimism. One lawyer deliberately refused to identify with either camp, choosing instead to remain somewhere between hope and uncertainty. His response was brief but revealing: "Only God knows."
Perhaps the most thought-provoking reflection came from a scholar who invoked both philosophy and Swahili literature. Referring to the Scottish philosopher David Hume's famous observation that "custom is the great guide of human life," the scholar recalled the words of the renowned twentieth-century Swahili writer Shaaban Robert:
"Mtu si mtumwa wa kitu chochote katika dunia hii zaidi ya kawaida zake mwenyewe; kawaida ndiyo serikali kuu."
The comparison was striking. Although writing in different contexts, both Hume and Shaaban Robert recognized the extraordinary power of habit in shaping human behaviour and public life. The scholar therefore concluded with a question that arguably lies at the heart of the July 9 Declaration:
Will this agreement change established political habits?
As he cautiously remarked, "Time will tell."
A professor at a Tanzanian university offered yet another perspective, observing that "One might think it is a well-tested strategy to diffuse the crisis rather than resolve it." Whether one agrees with that assessment or not, it captures an enduring concern in Zanzibar's political history: the possibility that negotiated settlements may successfully calm immediate tensions without necessarily addressing the institutional conditions that produced them in the first place.
Taken together, these diverse reactions reveal an important reality. The Declaration has generated optimism, caution, skepticism, religious reflection, philosophical inquiry, and historical comparison. More importantly, they all point—directly or indirectly—to the same fundamental question: can reconciliation become a permanent feature of Zanzibar's political institutions rather than another temporary political settlement?
The questions raised by these reactions are neither new nor merely rhetorical. They point to a deeper structural issue that has characterized Zanzibar's political development for decades. The central challenge has rarely been the absence of political agreements. Rather, it has been the inability to transform those agreements into durable institutions and enduring political norms.
David Hume's famous observation that "custom is the great guide of human life" helps explain why this distinction matters. His insight extends beyond individuals to political systems. Governments, institutions, and political actors often default to established habits rather than the principles they formally proclaim. Political behaviour is shaped not only by constitutions and negotiated agreements but also by routines, incentives, institutional culture, and the informal norms that govern political life. Unless those habits themselves are transformed, new agreements may simply reproduce familiar outcomes under different political circumstances.
This is why the distinction between political agreements and institutions is so important.
Political agreements are events. Institutions are systems. Agreements depend on signatures; institutions depend on rules, accountability, incentives, and public confidence. Agreements may reduce immediate political tensions, but only institutions can prevent those tensions from becoming recurring features of the political landscape.
Viewed from this historical perspective, an important question deserves careful consideration.
Why, after Muafaka I, Muafaka II, the 2009 reconciliation process, the Government of National Unity, and the post-2020 electoral reconciliation agreement, does Zanzibar still require another Declaration of Reconciliation in 2026?
The historical record suggests that the principal challenge has never been the absence of political settlements. Instead, it has been the institutionalization of those settlements. The issue has never been simply reaching agreements; it has been ensuring that the principles embodied in those agreements become embedded in governance, public administration, electoral management, and everyday political practice.
Interestingly, the remarks delivered by the Chairman of ACT Wazalendo during the signing ceremony appeared to acknowledge this challenge, albeit indirectly. In his speech, he identified three distinct groups with differing perspectives on the Declaration. I have no desire to identify myself with any of those groups. What I can say, however, is that I count myself among those who have personally experienced the circumstances that made this Declaration necessary.
From that standpoint, I found his remarks particularly significant because they implicitly recognized that reconciliation cannot ultimately be measured by political symbolism or ceremonial gestures. Its true measure lies in whether institutions are willing and able to translate political commitments into administrative practice, legal safeguards, and public confidence.
Viewed in this light, the July 9 Declaration should not be interpreted as the conclusion of a political process. Rather, it marks the beginning of a far more demanding phase.
The real test is whether Zanzibar can build institutions that command public confidence regardless of electoral outcomes. It is whether inclusive governance becomes a permanent feature of the political system rather than a temporary political compromise. It is whether transparency, accountability, constitutionalism, and the rule of law become enduring characteristics of governance instead of aspirations periodically reaffirmed through political declarations. Above all, it is whether political authority is genuinely returned to citizens through institutions capable of holding elected leaders accountable.
Perhaps Zanzibar's greatest challenge has never been the shortage of leaders capable of signing agreements. Its greater challenge has been building institutions strong enough to ensure that agreements survive changes in political leadership. Strong institutions outlive individuals. Political settlements that depend primarily upon personal goodwill often fade when the personalities who negotiated them leave office.
The challenge, therefore, is not merely to achieve reconciliation but to normalize it. Reconciliation should cease to be an exceptional political intervention triggered by moments of crisis and instead become embedded in the ordinary functioning of democratic institutions. Political maturity is achieved not when disagreement disappears, but when institutions become sufficiently resilient to manage disagreement without repeatedly requiring extraordinary settlements.
For that reason, neither excessive optimism nor excessive pessimism is warranted. Optimism alone cannot build institutions, and pessimism alone cannot reform them. What deserves careful attention now is whether political commitments evolve into public policy, whether public policy shapes administrative behaviour, and whether those practices ultimately become part of Zanzibar's enduring political culture.
History rarely remembers those who merely signed agreements; it remembers those who successfully implemented them. The lasting significance of the July 9, 2026 Declaration of Reconciliation will therefore not be determined by the ceremony at which it was signed, but by the integrity, consistency, and institutional commitment with which it is implemented.
Ultimately, it is results—not signatures—that will determine its place in Zanzibar's political history.
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